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Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq’s How to Save a Constitutional Democracy is a
terrific book.  In this comment, I address three issues: the important moment the
book marks on the value of the comparative method to the study of American
constitutionalism; the insights offered by this method to the risk of democratic
erosion in the United States and how those risks might be mitigated; and the need
to give greater weight than Ginsburg and Huq do to the role of federalism to counter
democratic erosion.
Let me begin with method.  We do not yet know how the Trump presidency will
end, let alone what its longer term legacy for the practice of American constitutional
democracy will be.  However, its intellectual legacy is already becoming clear: a
full-scale rethinking of American exceptionalism.  American exceptionalism – the
idea that the origin, development and practice of American constitutional democracy
are unique and must be understood on their own terms, without reference to the
experiences of other countries – is an assumption around which the study of
constitutional law and politics in the United States is built; it is also a cornerstone of
American political discourse.  
But as Ginsburg and Huq argue, the Trump presidency should end this kind of
scholarly and political parochialism, because (2 to 3):
many of the institutional and political dynamics apparent in the Untied
States today can also be traced in the recent history of other liberal
democracies in Europe, South America, and Asia. … The forces at work in
the United States are not … idiosyncratic local storms or tempests … They
are the climatic conditions of our political future.
Less they be misunderstood, it bears emphasis that Ginsburg and Huq are
not making an argument that comparative engagement is a platform toward
constitutional convergence.  Rather, the value of looking to other national
experiences is that “[t]he interaction of political strategy and legal frameworks
may vary with local circumstances, but patterns can also be observed across
countries and continents” (2).  In their methodological orientation, Ginsburg and
Huq join Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, who draw on historic examples of
democratic breakdown in Weimar Germany and Argentina to offer a diagnosis
of the rise of Trump and the character of the risk that he poses to the American
constitutional order in How Democracies Die.  But while Levitsky and Ziblatt root the
stability of constitutional democracy in the unwritten norms of mutual toleration and
forbearance, and argue that constitutional design can do little, if anything, to ensure
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the resilience of constitutional democracy in the face of a democratically-elected
autocrat, Ginsburg and Huq take constitutional design seriously (207):
Our emphasis throughout is on formal constitutional rules that might
mitigate erosion risk, however, and not on interventions to strengthen
norms and conventions of political life through some other means.
How do Ginsburg and Huq put constitutional comparativism to work? The core
question posed by Ginsburg and Huq is whether constitutional design can mitigate
the risk of the breakdown of constitutional democracy, or in fact has the perverse
effect of facilitating constitutional democracy’s erosion or collapse – with a
particular focus on the United States.  The heart of How to Save a Constitutional
Democracy lies in the application of the comparative method to this question. 
Through a global survey (focusing on the recent examples of Hungary, Poland,
Turkey and Venezuela), Ginsburg and Huq develop a taxonomy of mechanisms
whereby democratic erosion tends to occur (what I would term an “autocrats’
toolkit”): constitutional amendments altering basic governance arrangements, the
elimination of checks and balances (asserted by the courts and the legislature), the
centralization and politicization of executive power, the shrinking or distortion of the
public sphere, and the elimination or impairment of political competition (ch. 4).  
Ginsburg and Huq persuasively argue that the American constitution comes up
wanting, because it does little to offset these risks and may in fact increase them
(ch. 5).  Some of these shortcomings are the product of design, while others
have arisen because of judicial interpretation.  Many are familiar.  The relatively
rigid requirements for constitutional amendments under Article V are a bulwark
against what David Landau has helpfully called “abusive” amendments than erode
democracy.  On the other side of the ledger, the power of state legislatures to
gerrymander Congressional districts for nakedly partisan ends with few constitutional
constraints, and the responsibility of elected politicians at the state level for election
administration, both threaten political competition.  
But others have not hitherto been linked to the problem of democratic erosion, and
it is illuminating to view them in a new light.  One example is the combination of
judicial doctrines that allow for broad delegations by Congress to the executive,
alongside other doctrines that sharply limit Congressional power to retain oversight
over exercises of delegated authority.  Taken together, the result has been to
increase the scope of Presidential control over the executive, and the politicization
of the bureaucracy, and simultaneously, to fetter the ability of Congress to
oversee the new powers it has delegated.  Ginsburg and Huq helpfully define
constitutional democracy to include the “bureaucratic rule of law” – that is, the
impartial administration of statutes and regulations by career civil servants to
implement legislative policies, without fear or favour.  An autocratic president
could undermine the rule of law by directing the bureaucracy to wield extensive
delegated authority to favour supporters and punish political opponents, with little
Congressional oversight – and for which it is very difficult to seek a judicial remedy.
Another example is the federal judiciary.  In Poland and Turkey, the governing
parties have embarked upon the wholesale capture of the courts, in order to
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weaponize them against their political opponents.  As Ginsburg and Huq note, the
American constitutional experience also furnishes examples of weaponized courts
aligned with the ruling party —  the use by the Federalist Party of the 1798 Alien and
Sedition Acts to persecute its ideological opponents, by deploying a federal judiciary
packed with its supporters.  But they also argue that even if the federal courts were
not captured by a political party, the may lack “the necessary motivation to be robust
shields against democratic erosion” (146).  In the face of a “concerted program of
democratic erosion”, the executive would persistently oppose the federal courts,
which the evidence suggests would respond through quiescence in the interests of
institutional self-preservation.  Thus, the greatest risk posed by courts may not be
partisan capture, but indifference and self-interest.
Ginsburg and Huq propose a number of solutions for the American context, which
presuppose its existing constitutional system (ch. 7) – again, some familiar, some
not.  These measures are to create new institutions (independent boundary
delimitation commissions, professional non-partisan election administration),
renovate existing ones (Congressional “opposition rights” to enhance oversight,
Congressional cabinet members to soften partisan cleavages, enhancing
bureaucratic autonomy), and doctrinal (most notably, a judicially manageable
standard for partisan gerrymanders).  Rather than engaging in an analysis of the
instrumental rationality and political feasibility of these solutions, I instead examine
the role of federalism, as a target of would-be autocrats because of its role as a
potential check on democratic erosion, and how it how it has fared in that role in the
United States.
Federalism — or devolution, a more capacious term that encompasses a broader
variety of forms of decentralized government including municipalities — is largely
missing from Ginsburg and Huq’s analysis.  In an “aside” (at 148 to 150), they
dismiss the potential of federalism to check democratic erosion, because its
effects are not necessarily uniformly positive.  While they concede that states and
municipalities could potentially “provide platforms for alternative, anti-authoritarian
politicians”, those political units may also become “authoritarian enclaves” that would
not thwart and might increase the risk of democratic erosion through the diffusion of
autocratic modes of governance and political movements. 
To be sure, authoritarian enclaves are a dark chapter in the history of postbellum
American South, which only came to an end through federal government
intervention, in Robert Mickey’s masterful account.  And Edward Gibson has
insightly elucidated the political dynamics that maintain authoritarian enclaves
in otherwise democratic federations, drawing on the examples of Argentina and
Mexico, in addition to the United States.  Nevertheless, I think Ginsburg and Huq
are too quick to dismiss the potential of federalism to check democratic erosion. 
One of the striking features of contemporary American is the role played by state
governments led by Democratic governors in leading the opposition to President
Trump, with respect to a broad range of issues and in a variety of institutional fora. 
Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York has been particularly vocal in his opposition
to President Trump.  In California Governors Jerry Brown, and his successor, Gavin
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Newsom, have gone even further, and embraced the “resistance” label, and crafted
their governing agendas in direct opposition to those of President Trump.
How should we understand federal-state relations during the Trump administration
in light of how Governors Brown, Cuomo and Newsom have framed their agenda as
opposing that of President Trump?  To a considerable extent, these clashes merely
represent partisan disagreement between a Republican President and Democrat
state governors, on issues such as climate change and immigration, where the
parties have sharply different vierws.  The fact that these disagreements have led
state governors to pursue legal challenges to decisions of the Trump administration
– for example, the travel ban and climate change litigation – does not change their
partisan character.  Indeed, legal challenges brought by state governments to federal
policies when the other party controls the White House is nothing new; during the
Obama administration, Republican state governments challenged both Deferred
Admissions for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and the Affordable Care Act.  
But on closer examination, states with Democratic governors are playing roles
that Ginsburg and Huq assign to the other branches of the federal government in
checking democratic erosion, and/or seem to make up for those branches’ present
inability to do so in a manner functionally similar (albeit not equivalent) to what
they prescribe.  Let us begin with litigation.  In addition to challenges to Trump
administration policies, Democratic state governments have also brought suit in
the federal courts alleging that President Trump is in breach of the Emoluments
Clauses of the Constitution.  As I have explained, these clauses are checks against
official corruption, by prohibiting the President from receiving private financial
benefits for holding an elected office.  They therefore should be understood as
constitutional commitments to the bureaucratic rule of law — i.e. impartial public
administration without fear or favour.  State governments, deploying the machinery
of the federal courts, are serving a role that might be performed by Congress,
either by a Democratic minority wielding opposition rights, or by the newly elected
Democratic majority in the House of Representatives. 
Ginsburg and Huq identify the centralization and politicization of executive power
— the phenomenon of what Elena Kagan terms “presidential administration” — as
a tool of democratic erosion.  But American federalism constitutionally entrenches
the fragmentation of executive power, by dividing it between the federal government
and the states.  This makes the centralization of executive much more difficult
than it would be in a unitary state.  Even in a core area of federal authority —
immigration — the reality on the ground is what Cristina Rodríguez perceptively calls
“immigration federalism”, with states and localities playing a role in federal removal
policies, and in determining how immigrants, regardless of status, can integrate
into American life (e.g. drivers’ licences, access to education, etc.).  On this front,
California’s sanctuary laws (which sharply limit the ability of local law enforcement
to report undocumented immigrants to federal authorities), and the extension of
benefits toward undocumented immigrants (e.g. financial aid for higher education),
underline the potential scale and impact of state executive power.  
Finally, as I have previously argued in the context of South Africa, federalism may
enhance political competition, because it multiplies the opportunities for electoral
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choice and political competition, by increasing the number of governments that must
be democratically elected, and by creating different political majorities empowered
to elect different governments. The proliferation of opportunities to wield power
allows political parties that lose at the federal level to win at the state level through
the support of a different political majority. Moreover, states provide important
political resources to parties that strengthen their ability to compete federally. The
possibility of wielding power enhances the ability of parties to recruit and train
political elites. The expertise developed from political mobilization at the state level
can be transferred to federal elections. Finally, governing at the state level provides
parties with the advantages of incumbency, such as greater public profile and the
ability to shape public policy to enhance their base of political support.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the effect of federalism to increase political
competition at the national level is India. The Congress Party dominated Indian
politics for the two decades after independence, winning continuous majorities at the
national level as well as majorities in most states.  In the 1967 elections, Congress
faced a successful challenge from new regional parties at the state level, and lost
power in eight states. Victories by regional parties deprived the Congress Party of
the power of patronage and limited its ability to mobilize electoral support, which
culminated in outright losses by Congress in 1977, 1989 and 1996.  So too with
the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in Mexico, which won the Presidency in 2000
after winning the governorships in several states between 1992 and 2000, and
the Pakatan Harapan (PH) in Malayasia, which recently wrested power from the
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in elections in May 2018, building on
opposition victories in five states in 2008.
In India, we now see the same process unfolding, with the Congress Party’s recent
victories in state elections in December in Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and
Rajasthan – the heart of the Hindi-belt – were viewed as electoral contests of India-
wide significance.  State-level elections turned into a referendum against the policies
of Bharatiya Janata Party-led central government, especially on the crisis facing
India’s small farmers and demonetization.  As Pratap Mehta acutely observes, these
state-level electoral results have broken the BJP’s dominance of the Hindi-belt,
which is essential to its national electoral prospects in 2019.  Indian federalism is
promoting political competition.
In the American context, it is worth observing that several Presidents in the post-
war era had been state governors from the opposition party – both Democrat
(Presidents Carter and Clinton) and Republican (Presidents Reagan and George
H. Bush) – deriving the benefits of incumbency to contest for power nationally. 
To be sure, federalism is no guarantee of increased political competition, as the
sobering examples of authoritarian enclaves remind us.  But as I recently argued in
this blog, constitutional design needs to steer a pragmatic middle course between
constitutional idealism and nihilism – i.e. that thoughtful and careful design can
“save” constitutional democracy from erosion or that it can do nothing at all.  Rather,
all good constitutional design can do in the face of a determined autocrat with
successive electoral victories is to reduce the likelihood of democratic erosion,
principally by creating delays — “speed bumps” — in democratic erosion, which can
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serve as focal points for the defenders of constitutional democracy to mobilize public
opinion.  As adherents to this view of constitutional design, and as advocates of
redundancy to provide for multiple pathways to check democratic erosion, I hope that
Ginsburg and Huq will view my arguments for federalism as a friendly amendment to
their impressive arguments.
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